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MASS PICKETING LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
By NICHOLAS UNKOVIC

*

PICKETING by a union is a very effective economic weapon.

The picketing
may be peaceful or violent and, it may be carried on by employees or by
strangers. The picketing may consist of one or two pickets or of many "mass"
pickets. We are concerned here with the problem of mass picketing. In considering this problem particular attention must be given to the Pennsylvania
Labor Anti-Injunction Act of 1937 as qualified by the 1939 amendment,' which
removed certain restrictions imposed by the 1937 Act.
Before discussing the amendment, consideration should be given to the
policy underlying the 1937 Act. Patterned after the Federal Anti-Injunction
(Norris-La Guardia) Act, 2 the stated public policy of the 1937 Act is that it is
necessary for the individual, unorganized worker to have full freedom of selforganization and the right to designate representatives of his own choosing to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment without interference,
restraint, or coercion by employers or their agents in the exercise of these rights.
The declaration of policy pointed out that equity procedure, which permitted a
complaining party to obtain sweeping injunctive relief, without notice and hearing, based upon written affidavits alone and not wholly or in part upon examination, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses in open court, was
peculiarly subject to abuse in labor litigation.
The Labor Anti-Injunction Act of 1937 is still in force today, but a 1939
amendment rendered the restrictions on the granting of injunctions under that
act inoperative in certain cases. Further, the equitable powers of the courts of
common pleas in such cases were restored as originally exercised by such courts
under the Act of 1836.' Among other situations, there was specifically excluded
from the scope of the 1937 Act, by virtue of a 1939 amendment, any case,
Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined,4 an employe, or
employes acting in concert, or a labor organization, or the members, officers,
* A.B., Harvard University; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law; Member of the Pennsylvania
Bar; Member of the firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 206a-206r (1937). The policy behind this act is stated in Section
206b. For 1939 amendment see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206d (1939).
247 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1932).
3PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§251, 281 (1836).
4Section 206c defines the term "labor dispute" to include "any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment or
concerning employment relations or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of
employer and employe, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employe, and regardless of whether or not the employes are on strike with the
employer."
([111 ]
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agents, or representatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for such

organization, seize, hold, damage, or destroy the plant, equipment, machinery,
or other property of the employer with the intention of compelling the employer
to accede to any demands, conditions, or terms of employment or for collective
bargaining. 5
As stated in the case of Fountain Hill Mills v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers' Union,' "if a particular labor dispute falls within the exclusion of
section 206(d), [supra],compliance with the procedural requirements of pleading and proof of that statute is not a prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction .... " I
The basic reason for this exception to the applicability of the act is an
overriding public policy of protection and safety for all individuals. Where
there is a serious threat of force or violence, the interest of the state in protecting
life and property of the employees and employers is paramount to the possible
harm that might come to the union or laborers through quick action without all
the usual safeguards. Under these circumstances the state is willing to permit the
granting of a preliminary injunction by equity courts in accordance with the Act
of 1836. Regarding this policy, in Carnegie-IllinoisSteel Corp. v. United Steelworkers,8 the court said:
When any individual or organization under whatsoever name attempts to
use force to gain his or its ends they are attempting to usurp governmental
functions. This attempt unless promptly and effectively restrained by legally
constituted authority leads to lawlessness, disorder and anarchy, which is the
very negation of all government. The law cannot temporize with lawlessness.
The first duty of government is to govern, that is to maintain law and order at
all hazards and regardless of expense; only by doing this does it fulfill its

legitimate function, which is the protection of life, liberty and property.9

It has been held that this amendment, as well as the Labor Anti-Injunction
Act itself, is a procedural statute within the enacting power of the Pennsylvania
legislature,"0 and that neither violates the due process clause of the federal
constitution.11
Justice Bell, in Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union," reiterated
the state courts' right to issue injunctive relief. This sovereign power can only
5 Supra, note 2.
6 393 Pa. 385, 143 A.2d 354 (1958).
7Id. at 390, 391, 143 A.2d at 357, 358.
8 353 Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 857 (1946).
9 ld. at 429, 45 A.2d at 861.
10 Casass v. Monaghan, 65 F. Supp. 658 (W. D. Pa. 1946).
11 Casass v. Monaghan, 65 F. Supp. 658 (D. D. Pa. 1946); Palmerine v. Dravo Corp., 65 F.
Supp. 662 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
12 369 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952).
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be limited where it is restricted by the federal or state constitution, or where it
it clearly manifested by Congress to exclude states from exerting this police
power. According to prior judicial pronouncement, the controlling question is
whether the picketing which is sought to be prohibited is for an unlawful purpose. If the picketing is for an unlawful purpose the general equity jurisdiction
of the court is unrestricted, and an injunction restraining such picketing is not an
infringement of the constitutional guaranty of free speech. It necessarily follows that picketing is legal and within the protection of the Constitution if it is
peaceful, orderly and for a legitimate or lawful purpose.
However, a State is not required to tolerate in all places and in all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual; it is well established that the
method or conduct or purpose or objective of the picketing may make even
peaceful picketing illegal. 13
In General Building Contractors' Ass'n v. Local 542 " the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that federal assertion of power over labor disputes and
employee-employer relations under the Labor-Management Relations Act "
and the Norris-La Guardia Act 6 did not deprive state courts of equity from
exercising their traditional power to require performance of contractual duties
and, by injunctive relief, to prevent irreparable damage which would be brought
about by the failure to perform such duties. The opinion stated:
There does not exist any repugnance or conflict direct or indirect, between
the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of equity as in the instant case and the
Labor Management Relations Act and the Norris-La-Guardia Act. There are
no statutes which would curtail the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court in the
circumstances here presented. Prevention of violation of obligations contained
in a contract by injunctive relief is a power traditionally exercised by courts of
this Commonwealth. Congress has not acted upon the specific subject matter at
issue. Enforcement of contracts may be required according to the usual processes
17
of the law.

In Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,"8 under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, in a dispute between the employer and a labor union,
ordered the union, its officers, agents and members to cease and desist from mass
picketing of the employer's factory, threatening personal injury or property
damage to employees desiring to work, obstructing entrance to and egress from
Id. at 369, 85 A.2d at 857.
14370 Pa. 73, 87 A. 2d 250 (1952).
1561 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1947).
13

1647 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.
17 370
18 315

§§

101 et seq. (1932).

Pa. at 82, 87 A.2d at 255 (1952).
U.S. 740 (1942).
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the employer's factory, and picketing the homes of the employees. The sole
question presented was whether the said order was unconstitutional and void
as being repugnant to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
The United States Supreme Court held that the order was not unconstitutional as conflicting with the National Labor Relations Act, and that an intention
of Congress to exclude states from exercising their police powers must be clearly
manifested. The opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas stated, inter alia:
In sum, we cannot say that the mere enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, without more, excluded state regulation of the type which Wisconsin
has exercised in this case. It has not been shown that any employee was deprived of rights protected or granted by the Federal Act or that the status of
any of them under the Federal Act was impaired. Indeed, if the portions of
the state Act here invoked are invalid because they conflict with the Federal
Act, then so long as the Federal Act is on the books it is difficult to see how any
state could under any circumstances regulate picketing or disorder growing out
of labor disputes of companies whose business affects interstate commerce. 19
Not only the Supreme Court of the United States, but appellate courts ot
other jurisdictions have upheld the undisputed right and clear authority of the
state courts to invoke their police power in appropriate cases.2"
In the leading case of Garnerv. Teamsters Union, Local 776,1 which dealt
with the question of pre-emption, the United States Supreme Court held that
where a course of conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under both federal
and state statutes, the practice was within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board, and was not subject to the equitable powers of the state. The
Court found that Congress, in passing the Labor Management Relations Act,
had pre-empted the field to the extent of the statute's coverage. However, the
Court did not preclude all state action in the field of labor relations, and subsequent cases have defined more concretely the area of state competence.
After the Garner case, the first case that involved this issue was United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp." The petitioner in that case had
demanded that the respondent recognize it as the sole bargaining agent for respondent's employees on a particular construction project. Upon respondent's
refusal, the petitioner's agents threatened and intimidated respondent's office
19Id. at 751.
20See: International Union, U.A.W., A.F.L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C. 321, 67 S.E. 2d
372, (1951); Royal Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C. 545, 67 S.E. 2d 755,
(1951); Molders Union v. Texas Foundaries, Inc., 241 S.W. 2d 213, (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 9th Dist.,
1951); Goodwins Inc. v. Haggdorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d 697, (Ct. App., 1951); Southern
Bus Lines v. Street Railway Employees, 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765, (1949); Robinson Freight
Lines v. Teamsters Union, 28 L.R.R.M. 2453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).
21 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953) af/'d 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
22 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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with violence to such a degree that the respondent was forced to abandon the
construction project. The evidence indicated that a boisterous crowd of forty
to one hundred fifty men congregated at the project and that some of the men
used abusive language, that some were drunk, and that some carried guns and
knives. The damages recovered were for the resultant loss of profits on the
project. In this case the United States Supreme Court affirmed the state court
decree awarding an employer damages arising from tortious conduct under state
law, although it also constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) (1)
(A) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 3
The question was again presented in United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. 4 Here the dispute arose out of the failure
of appellant and the Kohler Company to reach an agreement on a new collective
bargaining contract. In a complaint to the Wisconsin Labor Board, Kohler
alleged that the appellant's members had engaged in mass picketing which obstructed access to Kohler's plant, prevented persons desiring to be employed
therein from entering the plant, coerced employees who desired to work, and
threatened the employees and their families with physical injury. The Wisconsin
Board issued an order directing the union and certain of its members to cease all
such activities.
The Court noted that the union's conduct was a violation of section 8(b)
(1) of the Labor Management Relations Act,25 and that, consequently, the
National Labor Relations Board could have issued an order similar to that
issued by the Wisconsin Board. However, the Court found that this did not
preclude the state from actiag. In support of the state authority the Court said:
As a general matter we have held that a State may not, in the furtherance
of its public policy, enjoin conduct "which has been made an 'unfair labor

practice' under the Federal statutes ....
" But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions
have made it clear that this general rule does not take from the States power to
prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of violence. The dominant
interest of the State in preventing violence and property damage cannot be
questioned. It is a matter of genuine local concern. Nor should the fact that
a union commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in violent conduct prevent States from taking steps to stop the violence.26
There are certain limits to the state action. For example, in Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc.2 ' respondent's premises were picketed by several of its employees,
numbering from eight to thirty-seven. Although none of the employees were
23

Labor Management Relations Act, c534 § l(b), 65 Stat. 601, 29 U.S.C. 158 (1951).

24351 U.S. 266 (1956).
25
Supra, note 23.
26 351 U.S. at 274 (1956).
27 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
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members of a labor union, many had signed applications to join Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, CIO. The apparent purpose of the picketing was
to compel respondent to recognize the union as the bargaining agent for its employees. While the picketing was accompanied by abusive remarks and some
acts of violence, there was no evidence that the picketing precluded access to
respondent's premises. The state court entered a decree enjoining not only the
threatening and intimidation of the employees but also all picketing of respondent's premises. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the order only insofar
as it restrained the intimidating acts, and reversed the order restraining all future
picketing. In this respect the Court said:
Though the state court was within its discretionary power in enjoining
future acts of violence, intimidation and threats of violence by the strikers and
the union, yet it is equally clear that such court entered the pre-empted domain
of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as it enjoined peaceful picketing
by petitioners.28
In two related, but separately appealed cases, illustrative of the limits on
state action, the Supreme Court in one case reversed a decree of a California
court enjoining picketing 2 and in another reversed a later decision of the California court granting damages allegedly arising from the picketing." In the
latter case the picketing arose from the failure of respondent Garmon to yield to
a union request that respondents retain in their employ only those workers who
were members of the union or who applied for membership within thirty days.
The record indicated that the picketing was peaceful. The Court held that the
state was precluded from awarding damages since the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. In the former case the Court
reversed the injunction holding that the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. In reconciling its decision with its
earlier cases, the Court stated:
It is true that we have allowed the States to grant compensation for the
consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by
violence and imminent threat to the public order . . . . We have also allowed
the States to enjoin such conduct . . . State jurisdiction has prevailed in
these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our
federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction . . . . In the present case
there is no such compelling state interest.31

It should be noted that in neither case did the state acquire jurisdiction
through the failure of the National Labor Relations Board to adjudicate the
28Id. at 139.
29 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
30 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
31 Id. at ; 3 Led 2d 775, 784 (1959).
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controversy. The Labor-Management Disclosure and Reporting Act of 1959,32
which was enacted subsequent to this case, expressly provides that jurisdiction
in state courts and agencies shall not be excluded in any case in which jurisdiction
is declined by the National Labor Relations Board. It is clear from the history
of this enactment and the reports of the respective labor committees of the House
and' Senate dealing with this statute that the provision is designed to meet the
problem arising in cases of duality of coverage (viz: coverage by state and
federal law), but in which remedy was not admissible in either forum; first,
because state relief was barred by federal coverage; and, second, because federal
relief was unavailable by reason of administrative declination of jurisdiction by
the National Labor Relations Board." Henceforth, state relief, whether by injunction or damage suit in the courts, or by action before appropriate administrative agencies, will be permissible in all cases where the National Labor Relations Board refuses to take jurisdiction under its jurisdictional "yardstick".
The problem of federal pre-emption has been considered in several Pennsylvania cases. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized that the
state is not precluded from exercising its police power in the field of industrial
3
relations. 4 In FountainHill Mills v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union,"
the argument that the filing of a petition with the National Labor Relations
Board ousted the state equity court of jurisdiction was rejected. The court held:
[E]ven if we assume that the National Labor Relations Board does have
jurisdiction over the controversy in question, this does not per se deny state
action in all cases. . . . In Allen-Bradley [case] it was held that the National
Labor Relations Act did not prevent the State from enjoining mass picketing,
threats or personal injury to employes desiring to work, or the obstruction of
ingress to and egress from the employer's factory. 6
Finally, in Taylor Fibre Co. v. Textile Workers Union,"7 the most recent
judicial pronouncement on this subject, the postion taken in the Wortex Mills "
and Fountain Hill Mills " cases was reaffirmed. The fact that a labor dispute
is subject to federal law does not alone make the federal jurisdiction exclusive.
A state court of equity may still issue an injunction to prohibit mass picketing.
Under these cases it is clear that the Pennsylvania state courts of equity are not
precluded from enjoining mass picketing by the doctrine of pre-emption.
32

73 Stat. 519 (1959).

33 See: Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).

34 See: Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953), aI'd, 346
U.S. 485 (1953).
35 393 Pa. 385, 143 A.2d 354 (1958).
36 Id. at 394, 395, 143 A.2d at 359.
37 395 Pa. 535, 151 A.2d 79 (1959).
38
Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union (CIO), 369 Pa. 259, 85 A.2d 851 (1952).
39 Fountain Hill Mills v. Amalgamated Clothing Worker's Union, 393 Pa. 385, 143 A.2d 354
(1958).
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Under what circumstances has section 206(d) of the Pennsylvania act been
enforced by the granting of a preliminary injunction on the filing of a bill supported by injunction affidavits? In the Carnegie-IllinoisSteel case" the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, speaking through Chief Justice Maxey, said:
[W)hen hundreds of pickets are massed, as at least two hundred were
here at a single gate, it is obvious that this force was not mustered for a peaceful purpose. When, as here, this force denied to the supervisors and to other
maintenance personnel access to plaintiff's plant, when such personnel were
"grabbed by pickets" and "forcibly detained", when other pickets threatened
"bloodshed if management did not stop making use of the 48 "Mill Gate",
when the superintendent of one of mills is "stopped by seven or eight pickets",
forcibly placed in an automobile and held under restraint for one hour and told
that some other employees "had been beaten up and he was lucky that he was
not" and that "they could throw him over the river bank", when superintendents and other executives of the plaintiff's corporation are halted by "pickets
massed in a solid group" and told that they cannot get into the plaintiff's plant
"if they do not have a Union Pass", and when such and similar acts of lawlessness are certified to in more than a dozen affidavits of apparently responsible
persons, it is time for the agencies of government to act and to re-establish
law and order. . . . The injunction issued in this case impinged on no one
except persons acting unlawfully or planning to act unlawfully.41

Similarly, in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers of America (CIO),Local 601

42

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held

that mass picketing immediately outside entrances, accompanied by intimidation
and threatened violence, for the purpose of implementing an expressly declared
intent or policy to prevent ingress to and egress from the employer's property
constitutes a seizure and holding of it, within the meaning of this exclusionary
clause. The court suggested,
[E]ven if it were technically to be held that the force which accomplishes
the seizure must be applied on the very premises of the employer, that technicality is satisfied when the pickets operate from positions in front of the gates,
because ordinarily the title to property abutting on a public highway extends to
the center of the highway, the sidewalk being for all intents and purposes a
part of the owner's premises subject only to the public's easement of passage.
43

Reasonable grounds for granting a decree to preliminarily restrain mass
picketing were present in the case of Yale Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Knitgoods

Workers Union,44 where the court found that,
40 353 Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 857 (1946).
41 Id. at 431, 45 A.2d at 862.
42 353 Pa. 446, 46 A.2d 16 (1946).
43 Id. at 455, 46 A.2d at 20.
44334 Pa. 23, 5 A.2d 323 (1939).
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[B]etween thirty-five and forty pickets, with signs on their hats and carrying banners, falsely stating the existence of a "strike", surrounded the factory
of plaintiff company; in the course of the picketing, violence was resorted to;
the plaintiff's employees were accosted, insulted, reviled and intimidated; a number were set upon and beaten; their clothing was torn, and on one occasion a
police guard was required to enable plaintiff's employees to enter the factory. The
pickets, by threats of violence and other expressions tending to intimidate,
prevented automobile trucks transporting merchandise consigned to plaintiff,
from making deliveries thereof, and from removing manufactured goods from
45
the plant.

The reasons which motivated the employer to seek an injunction were held
irrelevant to a determination of the legality of the picketing in the case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers.4" The court in that case
stated:
That court should have been concerned exclusively with the legal question of whether mass picketing, unaccompanied by violence, threats and intimidation, is illegal. Where such action is adjudged illegal, the good or bad

motive of an employer in insisting upon the enforcement of the legal principle
is immaterial. ..

.47

In conclusion we have seen that the Pennsylvania courts consistently hold
mass picketing under the above-illustrated circumstances to be illegal, since it is
accompanied by coercion, intimidation or threats. Where such circumstances
exist picketing is not peaceful and an injunction will be issued to enjoin unlawful
picketing. Further, the court may enjoin picketing conducted in an unlawful
manner or for an unlawful purpose on the mere filing of a bill supported by
affidavits alleging these facts. 48 The injunction will be issued even though petitioner's supervisory personnel do not appear to make a sincere effort to cross
the picket lines.4"
45 Id. at 25, 5 A.2d at 324, 325.
46 383 Pa. 297, 118 A.2d 180 (1955).
71d. at 302, 118 A.2d at 182.
48 Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union (CIO), 369 Pa. 259, 85 A.2d 851 (1952);
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 383 Pa. 297, 118 A.2d 180 (1955);
A.2d West Penn Twp. School Dist. v. Int'l Bd. of Electrical Workers, 396 Pa. 408, -

(1958).

49 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 383 Pa. 297, 118 A.2d 180

(1955).

